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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Skyrocketing health care costs have remained an issue of national concern for 
most of this decade.2  Many Americans have come to believe that one of the primary 
causes for the substantial increase in the cost of health care is fraud and abuse within 
the health care industry.3  The United States government reports that federally 
funded programs, such as Medicare,4 are fraught with fraud and abuse.5  The facts 
                                                                
1University of Houston Law Center, Candidate for L.L.M.  B.S.W., Southwest Texas State 
University; M.S.W., University of Texas at Austin; J.D., St. Mary’s University School of Law. 
With over ten years of experience as a mental health care provider, Ms. Mastin has worked 
extensively with mentally ill and chemically dependent patients in a variety of health care 
settings.  The author would especially like to thank Assistant United States Attorney Bud 
Paulissen, Criminal Division, Western District of Texas who challenged her to remember the 
duty that every health care provider has to the patients they serve in the midst of a complex 
health care delivery system.  Additionally, the author would like to thank Professor Nora V. 
Demleitner, St. Mary’s University School of Law, Mr. Ron Ederer, former U.S. Attorney, 
Western District of Texas, Mr. Van Hilley of Goldstein, Goldstein and Hilley, San Antonio 
Texas, and The Honorable Ewing Werlein, United States District Judge, Southern District of 
Texas.  The information and insight provided by these distinguished legal practitioners made 
this Article possible.  
2See Jane Bowling, AG wins grant for health fraud unit, DAILY RECORD, Oct. 6, 1995, at 3 
(reporting that the United States health care costs exceed $1 trillion). 
3See Charles J. Williams, Toward a Comprehensive Health Care Anti-Kickback Statute, 64 
UMKC L. REV. 291 (1995) (stating that Americans believe that increased health care costs are 
caused by fraud). 
4Medicare, a government sponsored health program for senior citizens, was established by 
Congress on July 30, 1965.  See Gloria J. Banks, Traditional Concepts and Nontraditional 
Conceptions: Social Security Survivor’s Benefits For Posthumously Conceived Children, 32 
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 251, 306 (1999).  The Medicare program was part of the Social Security 
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presented by the federal government seem to support this public belief.  The federal 
government estimates that seven percent of all billings submitted by the country’s 
Medicare providers are fraudulent.6  As a result, the government believes that the 
Medicare program lost an estimated $12.6 billion in 1998 due to fraudulent and 
improper billing.7 
In 1995, public outcry for reform and cost-cutting measures in the federal budget 
led the federal government to declare “war” on “health care fraud;” Janet Reno, the 
Attorney General of the United States at the time, announced that the prosecution of 
“health care fraud” would be the number one priority of the Department of Justice 
[hereinafter “DOJ”] after the prosecution of violent crimes.8  Soon after the DOJ’s 
declaration, in August of 1996, Congress passed the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act of 1996 [hereinafter “HIPAA”], which significantly strengthened 
enforcement efforts.9  
                                                          
Amendments to Title XVIII of the Social Security Act.  See id.  These Medicare Amendments 
established a health insurance system for eligible elderly and disabled individuals under which 
health care providers would be reimbursed directly for covered services and certain medical 
supplies and equipment provided to beneficiaries.  See Health Insurance for the Aged Act 
(Medicare Act of 1965) Pub. L. No. 89-97, tit. 1, 79 Stat. 290 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).  This Article will focus on “health care fraud” that occurs in 
the Medicare program. 
5The General Accounting Office [hereinafter “GAO”] has estimated the costs of health 
care fraud to be between $80 billion and $100 billion per year.  See Sidney M. Wolfe, Grim 
details under the headlines, 14 (2) HEALTH LETTER (Feb. 1, 1998). 
6See Rosie Mestel, Fighting Fraudulent Health Care Charges Medicare: The government 
and the AARP have teamed to teach seniors how to spot bogus billing for services not 
rendered or needed, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 1, 1999, at S3. 
7See Peter Eisler & Barbara Pearson, Fed triple health fraud cases: Crackdown hits 
Medicare billing abuses, USA TODAY, Feb. 23, 1999, at 1A. 
8See Charles Pereyra-Suarez et al., Litigation Issues In Fraud And Abuse, 19 WHITTIER L. 
REV. 51 (1997). 
9See Pub. L. No. 104-191, 5701 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 18 
U.S.C., 26 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.) (also referred to as the Kassebaum-Kennedy 
Act).  HIPAA required the Attorney General to establish a “Fraud and Abuse Control 
Program” to promote the coordination and cooperation between state, federal, and local law 
enforcement that investigate, evaluate, inspect and audit health care providers for fraudulent 
practices, provide specific guidance to providers and share information.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1320 
a –7c (1998); Debra Cohn, Health Care Fraud Legislation, U.S. ATT’YS BULL., Apr. 1997, at 
10.  Along with these guidelines, HIPAA provided additional civil, criminal and 
administrative methods to combat health care fraud.  See id.  One of these tools was the 
creation of an instrument to facilitate the decision-making process within the DOJ known as 
an authorized investigative demand that functions like a subpoena.  See Interview with United 
States Attorney Lynn Bataglia, District of Maryland, U.S. ATT’YS BULL., Apr. 1997, at 7 
[hereinafter Bataglia].  Unlike information secured in a grand jury subpoena, which is limited 
in its distribution, the distribution of information gathered under an authorized investigative 
demand allows the Assistant United States Attorney [hereinafter “AUSA”] working on the 
criminal proceeding to share information with the AUSA working on the civil proceeding.  
See id.  In addition to such tools, HIPAA secured financial resources to investigate and 
prosecute health fraud matters; initially, $47 million was appropriated in fiscal year 1997 for 
FBI enforcement activities, which was to increase gradually to $114 million by 2003.  See FBI 
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The government has made a mark in its campaign against “health care fraud.”  In 
the last two years, the federal government has dramatically increased the number of 
health care fraud investigations initiated.10  Thus, the number of criminal 
prosecutions has more than tripled since the government declared “war” on “health 
care fraud” with health care providers going to prison in record numbers.11  
Additionally, federal prosecutors opened 4010 civil health care fraud matters in 
1997,12 which represented the majority of the DOJ’s civil fraud workload for the first 
time in history.13  By the end of 1998, the government reported that there were 3471 
civil “health care fraud” matters pending.14  Finally, more than 2700 health care 
providers were excluded from participation in the Medicare program in 1997,15 
almost double the number of providers excluded in 1996.16  The number of 
exclusions continued to rise in 1998 with the government reporting that it excluded 
3021 health care providers.17  These governmental efforts netted a record $1.087 
billion in judgments, settlements and fines in 199718 and the collection of $480 
                                                          
Fraud Cases Number 2800, For Seven Cases Per Agent, in FY 1999, HEALTH NEWS DAILY, 
Feb. 12 1999, available at 1999 WL 10483289 [hereinafter FBI Fraud Cases].  Additionally, 
HIPAA established a Health Care Fraud and Abuse Control Account in the Medicare Trust 
Fund, which provided $104 million in fiscal year 1997 for health care enforcement activities 
as determined by the DOJ and HHS; the amount allocated to the DOJ was spent on personnel, 
automated litigation support, and training.  See Cohn, supra, at 11.  See also Attorney General 
Highlights, U.S. ATT’YS BULL., Apr. 1997, at 52 (reporting that funding was authorized for 
166 new positions at the DOJ). 
10See THE DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES AND THE DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HEALTH 
CARE FRAUD AND ABUSE CONTROL PROGRAM – ANNUAL REPORT FOR FY 1997 (1998) 
[hereinafter 1997 ANNUAL REPORT]; THE DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES AND THE 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HEALTH CARE FRAUD AND ABUSE CONTROL PROGRAM – ANNUAL REPORT 
FOR FY 1998 (1999) [hereinafter 1998 ANNUAL REPORT]. 
11See 1997 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 10. (stating that 363 defendants were convicted of 
health care fraud related crimes); 1998 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 10 (stating that 326 
defendants were convicted of health care fraud related crimes.)  See also Eisler & Pearson, 
supra note 7, at 1A (explaining that 552 criminal cases of health care fraud up from 166 in 
1993). 
12See 1997 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 10. 
13See T. Jeffrey Fitzgerald, Health Care Providers Encounter the Civil False Claims Act 
28 JAN COLO. LAW 65 (January 1999) (reporting that over sixty percent of the DOJ’s civil 
fraud workload consists of health care fraud matters). 
14See 1998 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 10. 
15See 1997 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 10. 
16See id.; HIPAA’s Anti-Fraud Measures Led To Dramatic Spike In Medicare Exclusions, 
6 (5) WASH. HEALTH WEEK, Feb. 2, 1998 (explaining that as a result of the enactment of 
HIPAA there has been a dramatic spike in the number of Medicare program exclusions). 
17See 1998 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 10. 
18See 1997 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 10. 
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million in 1998.19  The government states that it will maintain this return on its 
actions as settlements and fines are collected in future years.20 
Clearly, the government’s “war” on “health care fraud” continues to rage.21  But 
what is “health care fraud?”  How should it be defined?  How “health care fraud” is 
defined is especially significant to health law practitioners in light of a recent case in 
which two Kansas lawyers were indicted in a Medicare kickback case.22  Although 
the federal government asserts that billions of dollars are lost to “health care fraud,” 
these numbers include situations that result from honest mistakes.23  The government 
has admitted that in its reporting of “health care fraud,” it is unable to distinguish 
situations where honest mistakes were made from acts of intentional fraud.24  In fact, 
the False Claims Act [hereinafter “FCA”], the most commonly utilized civil statute 
under which health care providers are sued for “health care fraud” includes health 
care providers that have merely made mistakes.25  
The FCA requires that the act be committed “knowingly.”26  However, proof of 
intentional wrongdoing is not required to successfully bring a civil action under the 
FCA.27  As a result, a health care provider can be found strictly liable for an act of 
“health care fraud.”28  The government’s failure to distinguish between intentional 
acts and mistakes in its war against “health care fraud” allows health care providers 
who have made mistakes to be accused of committing “health care fraud” and 
                                                                
19See 1998 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 10, at 2. 
20See id. 
21See Medicare has new plan to fight fraud: The government’s latest campaign enlists the 
help of its beneficiaries to curb wrongdoing, STAR-TRIBUNE, Feb. 21, 1999, at 4A (reporting 
that on February 24, 1999, the government will increase its troops in the “war” on “health care 
fraud” by asking its Medicare beneficiaries to report billing errors for a $1000 reward). 
22See Jay Christiansen, Chairman’s Corner, THE HEALTH LAWYER, Nov. 1998, at 2.  Here, 
Mr. Christiansen, Chairman of the Health Law Section of the American Bar Association 
expresses his concern about the case and its implications in regards to lawyers that practice 
health law. See id. 
23See Nancy Dickey, Government to Grandpa: Rat out your Doctor, WALL ST. J., Feb. 24, 
1999, at A18 (describing the way the government determines fraud and abuse in health care). 
Nancy W. Dickey is the President of the American Medical Association [hereinafter “AMA”].  
See id. 
24See id. 
25See Fitzgerald, supra note 13. 
2631 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (1996). 
27See United States v. Frizek, 111 F.3d 934, 942 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (stating that the standard 
is more comparable to gross negligence or “an extreme version of ordinary negligence”); 31 
U.S.C. § 1329 (b)(3) (1996). 
28See Leon Aussprung, Fraud and Abuse: Federal Civil Health Care Litigation and 
Settlement, 19 J. LEGAL MED. 1, 8 (1998) (stating that in United States v. Metzinger Assoc., 
No. 94-7520, 1996 WL 530002 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 17, 1996), defendants that did not cooperate 
ended up with settlement agreements less favorable than defendants that did). 
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sanctioned when in reality their conduct does not represent an act of fraud.29  A 
definition of “health care fraud” that disregards the mens rea of the provider has a 
devastating effect on the provider’s ability to deliver quality health care services to 
the American people.30  This reckless way of defining “health care fraud” at best 
brings an element of adversarial tension into the patient-health care provider 
relationship that fosters distrust between patients and their health care providers.31  
At worst, health care providers that have dedicated their lives to providing quality 
health care services will lose their ability to pursue their livelihood, their reputations 
amongst their peers and even their freedom.  
Although the definition of “health care fraud” is only one of the numerous issues 
of concern to health law practitioners and health care providers, the language that 
defines the conduct in question is the foundation of all other concerns related to 
“health care fraud.”  This Article will demonstrate the need for a narrowly construed 
definition of “health care fraud.”  The Article begins by providing a scenario to 
explain how a situation involving potential “health care fraud” can arise in the 
delivery of health care services.  The Article then addresses how “health care fraud” 
is defined through a discussion of the process of the applicable proceedings and the 
penalties that may result.  The Article concludes by proposing a way to define 
“health care fraud” that will result in a system of sanctions that is equitable and 
proportional to the conduct committed by the health care provider. 
II.  THE ACT: MISTAKE OR FRAUD? 
“Health care fraud” is predominantly discerned by the government in some form 
of billing practice; this fraudulent billing practice usually involves the submission of 
many small claims, some of which are legitimate services to the payor of the 
delivered health care service or product.32  The following hypothetical demonstrates 
                                                                
29See Dickey, supra note 23; interview with Mr. Van Hilley, Attorney, in San Antonio, 
Texas (Mar. 30, 1999). 
30See Medicare has new plan to fight fraud: The government’s latest campaign enlists the 
help of its beneficiaries to curb wrongdoing, supra note 21 (reporting that the leaders of the 
AMA met with Medicare officials to complain about the governments use of inflammatory 
language towards doctors because it will undermine the patient-doctor relationship); Mestel, 
supra note 6 (reporting that physicians are concerned that the government’s education 
campaign on health care fraud amounts to “[y]ou can turn your doctor in and get a piece of the 
action . . . that’s basically what it amounts to”).  Additionally, health care providers are 
concerned because the Clinton administration will pay a $1000 reward to Medicare 
beneficiaries for tips.  See id.; Eisler, supra note 7 (reporting that health care providers are 
concerned that “overzealous investigations target innocent breaches of complex billing rules).  
31See Dickey, supra note 23 (stating that government tactics place doctor and patients in 
adversarial roles causing detention in their relationship); Mestel, supra note 6 (expressing 
concern that government’s campaign will undermine the doctor-patient relationship). 
32The largest purchaser of health care services is the federal government. See Press 
Release, Medicare, Health Care Financing Administration, Health Care Spending at Record 
(Jan. 13, 1998), at <http:// www.hcfa.gov/medicare/medicare.htm.  A federal government 
health program pays almost fifty cents of every dollar currently spent on health care in the 
United States. Id. 
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how many health care providers may end up being investigated and prosecuted for 
activities involving health care fraud.33 
After completing nine months of employment, Dr. G terminated Nurse Black 
without notice from her position as program manager at the Twilight Mental Health 
Center [hereinafter “Center”], an outpatient psychiatric clinic for mentally ill senior 
citizens located in a low-income urban neighborhood.  The three-year old Center, 
owned and operated by corporation H, is staffed by two psychiatrists, a family 
physician, a program manager, a clinical social worker, a licensed vocational nurse, 
two mental health technicians, and two clerical workers.  The physicians are majority 
shareholders of the corporation and are on the Board of Directors.  The average 
monthly patient census at the Center is about twenty-eight patients with ninety 
percent of them being funded entirely by the Medicare program. 
Angry about being laid-off, Nurse Black decided to file a lawsuit for wrongful 
termination.  During the initial consultation, she told her attorney that she believes 
the Center is operating in violation of federal law.  She stated that when she first 
became aware of the Center’s inappropriate business practices she did not say 
anything because she was afraid of losing her job.  Two months before she was fired, 
she decided to make the medical director aware of her concerns.  At the meeting with 
Dr. G, Nurse Black told the physician that she believed that some of the billing and 
referral practices of the Center did not comply with federal law and certain Medicare 
regulations.  In addition, she told him some of the patients were inappropriately 
referred to the Center because they did not demonstrate a mental condition that could 
be successfully treated by the Center’s existing clinical services.  Dr. G thanked her 
for the information and told her that he would investigate her allegations.  Nurse 
Black did not speak to Dr. G further about this matter.  Two months later, Dr. G told 
her that she was being laid-off because her position was being eliminated due to 
budgetary constraints. 
Nurse Black explained to her attorney that the Center had been inappropriately 
soliciting new patients for the Center by paying local family physicians a fee of $100 
for every elderly patient referred to the Center for psychiatric care, regardless of the 
mental status of the prospective patient.  Additionally, Mrs. Black believed that 
approximately one third of the claims submitted to Medicare were upcoded.34  
Furthermore, she believed that rather than billing the services provided in the 
program in one daily rate, the Center was billing for each service individually.35  
                                                                
33The following facts are not based on any specific situation. Any similarity to a specific 
situation is a complete coincidence. 
34Upcoding is a fraudulent practice whereby the patient’s situation is upgraded to a more 
serious category indicating the delivery of a more complex medical service where the health 
care provider presents a “billing for a more expensive service than that which is actually 
provided to the patients” to the payor for payment.  See United States v. Brown, 988 F.2d 658, 
659 (6th Cir. 1993); Medicare Fraud or Honest Mistake, CHI. TRIB., July 19, 1998, at 12, 
available at 1998 WL 2877439. 
35This fraudulent practice is referred to as “unbundling.”  See Metzinger Assoc., 1996 WL 
530002, at.  Here, services that are usually billed as a group at a special rate under a single 
procedure code are billed separately under individual procedure codes, allowing providers to 
be paid more.  See id.  The American Hospital Association [hereinafter AHA] has challenged 
the DOJ’s position that unbundling is fraudulent.  See Fitzgerald, supra note 13.  AHA states 
that this position is legally unfounded and abusive towards health care providers.  See id. 
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Additionally, Nurse Black revealed that the other psychiatrist who usually had 
about thirteen patients admitted to the outpatient program would come to the Center 
at lunchtime and chat with all of them for about five minutes once a week.  Often, 
the doctor would simply ask the nurse on duty how the patients were and then write 
psychotherapy notes in their individual charts.36 For these five-minute visits and non-
existent visits, Nurse Black believed that the psychiatrist billed Medicare for fifty-
minute psychotherapy sessions. 
After carefully considering the situation, her attorney agreed to take her case and 
shortly thereafter filed a formal suit against the Center and the doctors for wrongful 
termination.  After this initial suit was filed, the attorney filed a qui tam37 complaint 
in the appropriate United States District Court which remained under seal for sixty 
days while the DOJ determined if the cause of action was viable and whether or not 
DOJ would take over the prosecution of this case for Nurse Black.  Four months 
after discharging Nurse Black, Dr. G received a letter from the DOJ informing the 
corporate owner that an investigation had been initiated to determine if the Center 
has been engaged in acts of “health care fraud.” 
                                                                
36This fraudulent billing practice is referred to as “retracting.”  Retracting occurs when the 
health care provider bills for services that were never provided.  See United States v. Skodnek, 
933 F. Supp. 1108, 1114 (D. Mass. 1996). 
37Although health care fraud is brought to the attention of the DOJ in numerous ways, the 
government has become increasingly aware of fraud and abuse situations through the reports 
of government informants.  In 1992, there were seventeen “health care fraud” qui tam cases 
filed, while in 1998 there were 283 cases filed.  See FBI Fraud Cases, supra note 9.  The FCA 
establishes a private right of action for claims filed on behalf of the United States government 
by private parties known as qui tam actions.  See 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (1996).  In qui tam actions, 
private citizens are allowed to file a lawsuit in the name of the government charging false 
claims.  See § 3730 (b).  Statutorily almost anyone but a member of the military can file such a 
lawsuit.  See § 3730.  These individuals are usually fellow medical professionals.  See 
Bataglia, supra note 9, at 7.  The statute even encourages persons that participated in the fraud 
to come forward.  See 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (D)(2) (1996).  Regardless of their level of 
culpability, the statute always requires the plaintiff, referred to as the relator, to be someone 
with personal knowledge of the fraud or abuse.  See id.  See also Aussprung, supra note 28, at 
9.  The relator must have direct and independent knowledge of the information on which the 
allegations are based.  See 31 U.S.C.§ 3730(e)(4)(B) (1996).  If there has been previous public 
disclosure, the plaintiff or relator in a qui tam action must be the original source of the 
reported information.  See § 3730.  The statute provides encouragement to the relator to report 
fraud and abuse through financial rewards pursuant to the statute.  See id.  The reward will 
amount to ten to thirty percent of the total recovery.  See § 3730(c)(2)(d)(5)(d).  The exact 
amount depends upon such factors as the degree of the relator’s involvement in the fraud, the 
relator’s contribution to the prosecution, and the extent of the government’s intervention.  See 
Adam Snyder, The False Claims Act Applied to Health Care Institutions: Gearing Up for 
Corporate Compliance, 1 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 1, 9 (1996).  Whistle blowers are 
important in prosecuting health fraud cases because of the difficulty investigative agents have 
in discerning the fraudulent conduct within extremely complex and sophisticated billing 
schemes.  See David R. Olmoes, Health Care’s New Breed of Whistle-Blower, L.A. TIMES, 
Feb. 17, 1998, at A1. The lawsuit is filed under seal for sixty days.  See 31 U.S.C. § 
3730(b)(4) (1996).  During this time period, the DOJ determines if it will take over the 
prosecution of the case.  See § 3730. 
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III.  HEALTH CARE FRAUD PROSECUTION 
A.  Triple Proceedings 
Government officials believe that “health care fraud” cases should be evaluated 
with the full range of remedies available to deter future fraudulent activities.38  As a 
result, “health care fraud” defendants face criminal, civil, and administrative 
sanctions.39  When the federal government first declared war on “health care fraud,” 
the government’s position was that all defrauders were going to be criminally 
prosecuted, a stance similar to the government’s campaign against defendants 
involved in the savings and loan banking crisis during the 1980’s.40  During that 
period of time, the DOJ relied primarily on criminal prosecutions and put many 
white-collar criminals in prison.41 
In that process, the government spent millions of dollars prosecuting cases and 
put numerous non-violent first-time offenders in prisons without recovering its 
losses.42  Initially, the DOJ approached its campaign against health care fraud in the 
same manner,43 however, the government soon realized that banks and savings and 
loans are not like hospitals.44  “The government cannot close down all the hospitals 
and put all the docs in jail.”45  In response to this realization the government relies 
upon a process of triple proceedings in the resolution of “health care fraud” cases.46  
Any situation where health care fraud is alleged can spawn simultaneous 
administrative, criminal, and civil investigations and proceedings.47  Although these 
separate proceedings are considered simultaneous, they have been started as much as 
one year apart from each other.48 
The Office of Inspector General of the Health and Human Services Department 
[hereinafter “OIG”] and the Federal Bureau of Investigations [hereinafter “FBI”] are 
the primary investigative agencies.49  Under HIPAA, the agents of OIG were given 
authority to conduct criminal investigations involving health care fraud.50  Although 
                                                                
38See Bataglia, supra note 9, at 9. 
39See id. 
40See Interview with Mr. Ron Ederer, former U.S. Attorney, Western District of Texas, in 
San Antonio, Texas (Apr. 1, 1999) [hereinafter Ederer]. 
41Id. 
42Id. 
43Id. 
44Id. 
45See Ederer, supra note 40. 
46See id.; Geoffrey A Goodman, Parallel Proceedings in Complex Health Care Fraud 
Cases: The Blue Shield of California Cases, U.S. ATT’YS BULL., June 1997, at 8. 
47See Ederer, supra note 40. 
48See Hilley, supra note 29. 
49See Adelaide Few & Jay G. Trezevant, Fighting the Battle Against Health Care Fraud: 
Federal Enforcement Actions, 72 FLA. B.J. 34 (1998). 
50See Ederer, supra note 40. 
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the OIG agents are experts in ferreting out incidences of fraud and abuse in the 
health care context, there are simply not enough of them to adequately discern 
instances of fraud and abuse.51  This lack of manpower affects the interpretation of 
the discovered information and ultimately the nature of the sanctions faced by health 
care providers.52  
The number of FBI agents investigating health care fraud increased under 
HIPAA.53  Unfortunately, these FBI agents are not specifically trained to investigate 
health care fraud activities.54  While they are quite capable of investigating 
traditional criminal activities, they are not able to easily identify and recognize 
evidence needed to prove fraudulent activity or distinguish fraudulent activity from 
mistakes.55  The ability to glean a pattern of intentional or mistaken fraudulent billing 
from a set of Medicare documents can be quite formidable for the untrained eye due 
to the complexity of the Medicare billing process.56  Hence, whether the government 
undertakes a civil or a criminal prosecution against a defrauder will depend heavily 
on the quality of the evidence gathered in the investigation.57  However, by the time 
the defendant is aware she is under investigation for health care fraud, the 
government has probably determined that the case is sufficient to proceed.58  This 
governmental advantage has convinced numerous defendants to negotiate a 
settlement rather than finance a very expensive defense.59 
Congress has given the DOJ and OIG the authority to prosecute “health care 
fraud” in the Medicare Program through a number of statutes.60  The DOJ takes the 
lead in determining how to proceed with prosecution of the “health care fraud” 
defendant.61  Whether the DOJ’s decides to prosecute the “health care fraud” 
defendant in a criminal proceeding, or sue them in a civil proceeding, or proceed in 
both contexts, depends on how the government can best realize its goals in relation to 
the specific facts of each case.  The government hopes to recover its losses and 
reduce incidences of fraud and abuse without undermining the delivery of health care 
                                                                
51Id.  Two agents cover central and south Texas.  Id. 
52See id.   
53See FBI Fraud Cases, supra note 9 (explaining that HIPAA increased the number of FBI 
agents).   
54See Ederer, supra note 40. 
55See id. 
56See id.; Hilley, supra note 29. 
57See Ederer, supra note 40. 
58See Aussprung, supra note 28 at 8; Pereyra-Suarez, supra note 8, at 64. 
59See Aussprung, supra note 28, at 8; Stuart M. Gerson, Will New Federal Guidelines 
Arrest Overzealous Use of False Claims, 4 (1) ANDREWS HEALTH CARE FRAUD LITIG. REP. 10 
(stating that providers firmly believe that they must “settle or perish”).   
60See Pamela Bucy, Crimes by Health Care Providers, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 589 (1996) 
(providing an exhaustive discussion of the numerous statutes available to the government for 
the prosecution of health care fraud in criminal proceedings). 
61See Few, supra note 49. 
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services.62  Who the defendants are, their individual culpability, and the quality of 
the evidence against them, are pivotal issues of fact in determining how the 
government will proceed and the type of sanctions that could be imposed on the 
defendant.  
Generally, where “health care fraud” is alleged, the government will initially sue 
any institutional defendant in a civil proceeding under the FCA because of the 
potential for a substantial monetary award.63  Because the government is more likely 
to recover the alleged monetary loss of the fraud from the institutional providers than 
from the individual provider, institutional defendants are the primary targets in the 
government’s campaign against health care “fraud.”64  Government officials believe 
that sanctions involving monetary considerations of tremendous magnitude will deter 
repeat fraudulent practices.65  
In addition to recovering substantial judgments, it is easier and more 
advantageous to the government to sue the “health care fraud” defendant in a civil 
proceeding rather than prosecute them in a criminal proceeding. In a civil action, the 
government’s burden of proof is the “preponderance of the evidence” standard,66 a 
much lower standard than the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard required in the 
criminal proceeding.67  The government does not have to prove that the health care 
provider acted intentionally with knowledge of committing fraud.68  At the end of the 
civil proceeding, the government has recovered its losses and has imposed 
substantial penalties on the defendant without having to prove intentional fraud.69  
The sanctions imposed as a result of the civil proceeding are devastating to the 
majority of institutional defendants.70  With its financial goals realized, there is little 
incentive for the government to spend its limited resources on a criminal 
prosecution.71  
                                                                
62See Bataglia, supra note 9, at 7. 
63See Ederer, supra note 40; Hilley, supra note 29. Bucy, supra note 60, at 589 (citing 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATT’YS MANUAL § 9-42.210 (1992)). 
64See Bataglia, supra note 9, at 4 (stating that many institutional providers are the subjects 
of criminal and civil investigations because of the prevalence of fraud that is perpetrated, 
primarily in the Medicare arena).  
65See id.; Eisler, supra note 7 (reporting Senator Aging’s response to claims that 
aggressive investigations will harm innocent health care providers). 
66See generally Commercial Contractors Inc. v. United States, 154 F.3d 1357, 1362 (1st 
Cir. 1998). 
67See generally United States v. Abdullah, 162 F.3d 897, 906 (6th Cir. 1998). 
68See infra Part III.B.(1). 
69See id. 
70See Aussprung, supra note 28, at 56. 
71See Bataglia, supra note 9, at 7 (stating “it may be more appropriate to bring a case 
civilly because of its treble damages potential . . . . [c]ases are driven by monetary 
considerations . . . that deters repeat [institutional] behavior”).  In addition, no Medicare 
claims processing contractor had been convicted of fraud despite numerous civil investigations 
and huge settlements until the case against Blue Shield of California.  See Aussprung, supra 
note 28, at 8. 
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If the fraudulent conduct is of such an egregious nature that the DOJ believes it 
must be stopped, the individual defendants are most likely to be criminally 
prosecuted.72  In order to proceed with the criminal proceeding, the DOJ must be 
able to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the individual defendants committed 
this wrongful act intentionally. Proving the culpability of the defendants beyond a 
reasonable doubt to a jury is the lynchpin in the DOJ’s decision to prosecute.73  This 
means that the government must be able to prove that the wrongful conduct was 
committed knowingly and willfully.74  The DOJ’s ability to prove that the individual 
defendants acted knowingly and willfully is what makes the commitment of “health 
care fraud” a crime. 
The remainder of this Article will demonstrate how these governmental policies 
and individual factors determine the government’s case and the defendant’s 
punishment in the civil, criminal and administrative contexts.75 
B.  The Civil Proceeding 
1.  The False Claims Act 
In a civil proceeding, the government is most likely to prosecute under the 
FCA.76  The FCA was first enacted during the Civil War to aid the government in its 
prosecution of gunpowder manufacturers who sold sawdust rather than gunpowder to 
the government.77  Later, this statute was revived to prosecute defense contractors 
who defrauded the government.78  The FCA creates liability for defendants who act 
against the government by presenting or causing the presentation of a false, or 
fraudulent claim for payment or approval; using a false statement or record to get a 
false or fraudulent claim paid or approved; and conspire to defraud the government 
to get a false or fraudulent claim allowed or paid.79  Health care providers can be 
found strictly liable under the FCA.80  This lack of a requirement to prove a specific 
intent to defraud makes it extremely difficult to defend false claims cases and rather 
easy for the government to assert a claim of fraud successfully.81  
                                                                
72See Bataglia, supra note 9, at 4 (stating that the government may want to prosecute 
criminally if it believes the behavior of the individual defendant that could further harm the 
community must be stopped). 
73See Ederer, supra note 40; Hilley, supra note 29. 
74See generally 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (1998). 
75See Carol S. Steiker, Punishment and Procedure: Punishment Theory and the Criminal-
Civil Procedural Divide, 85 GEO. L.J. 775, 803 (1997) (stating that any act inflicted on another 
that inflicts pain can be considered punishment). 
76See 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (1996). 
77See Aussprung, supra note 28, at 5. 
78See id. at 6. 
79See 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (1996). 
80See Aussprung, supra note 28, at 8. 
81See id. 
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The activities that make out the act of “presenting or causing to be presented to 
the United States a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval” are described 
in the statute in general terms.82  Courts have interpreted the statute to allow a broad 
array of actions to be considered the basis for a “submission of a false claim.”83  As a 
direct result of this broad interpretation of the statute, the definition of “health care 
fraud” has broadened to include quality of care issues,84 along with mistaken 
statutory interpretations made by the provider.85  Much controversy has arisen from 
the latter situation as to whether or not the provider has committed an inadvertent 
error or whether the error actually represents a difference of opinion regarding 
statutory interpretation between the government and the medical community.86  
Health care providers have been prosecuted for “health care fraud” where real 
differences of opinion regarding statutory interpretation were present.87  
Today, it is possible to be sued in the civil context for malpractice and negligence 
in regards to a quality of care issue or mistake and then face further liability under 
the FCA for the submission of a fraudulent claim to a government insurer during the 
time the poor quality of care situation existed or mistake occurred.88  The lack of 
                                                                
8231 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (1996). 
83See Aussprung, supra note 28, at 32. 
84The U.S. Attorney’s Office in Philadelphia has obtained three settlements in cases where 
the allegations were based entirely on the provision of poor quality-of-care and that the 
resulting Medicare reimbursements were based on false claims only because quality-of-care 
violations were present.  See United States v. Chester Care Ctr., No. 98CV-139, 1998 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 4836 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 2, 1998); United States v. City of Philadelphia, No. 98-4253 
(E.D. Pa. 1998); United States v. GMS Management-Tucker, Inc., No. 96-1271 (E.D. Pa. 
1996).  Currently, there is only one reported case demonstrating judicial support of this theory.  
See United States ex rel. Aranda v. Community Psychiatric Ctrs., 945 F. Supp. 1485 (W.D. 
Okla. 1996).  This theory is referred to as the “implied certification theory.”  See Chester 
Care, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4836.  How this theory would be accepted by trial courts is 
questionable considering that both the Fifth and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals have ruled 
that claims for services rendered in violation of statutes “do not necessarily constitute false or 
fraudulent claims under the FCA.”  See United States ex rel. Thompson v. Columbia/HCA 
Health Care Corp., 125 F.3d 899, 902 (5th Cir. 1997).  See also United States ex rel. Hopper v. 
Anton, 91 F.3d 1261, 1266 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating that “violations of laws, rules or 
regulations alone do not create a cause of action under the FCA”).  However, other AUSAs are 
attempting to bring such actions forward across the country.  See United States ex rel. 
Mckenzie v. Crestwood Hosp., Inc., No. 2:97cv107 (E.D. Cal., Oct. 8, 1998). 
85See Fitzgerald, supra note 13; Ederer, supra note 40; Hilley, supra note 29. 
86See Dickey, supra note 23; Hilley, supra note 29. 
87But see Jonathan S. Shapiro, United States v. Ivan Namihas, M.D.: He Never Cried for 
Us, U.S. ATT’YS BULL., June, 1997, at 5 (discussing case of physician who intentionally lied to 
the government, committing fraud). 
88See David R. Hoffman, The Federal False Claims Act as a Remedy to Poor Care, U.S. 
ATT’YS BULL., Apr., 1997, at 36 (stating that United States v. GMS Management-Tucker Inc. 
represented the first time that the federal government brought an action under the FCA in 
conjunction with the Nursing Home Reform Act to remedy a situation where health care 
providers received reimbursement from government funds for the provision of inadequate 
care).  It should be further noted that as the delivery of health care services changes from a 
fee-for-service system to a capitated system, courts may become increasingly receptive to this 
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culpability on the part of the provider to commit an intentional act of fraud and the 
expanded definition of “health care fraud” allow health care providers to be accused 
of committing “health care fraud” when in reality their conduct does not represent an 
act of intentional fraud. 
2.  Civil Penalties 
The DOJ has come to regard the FCA as one of its best weapons in its campaign 
against “health care fraud.”  “Health care fraud” is most frequently prosecuted under 
the FCA because it is relatively easy to prove the elements of the offense and 
because the potentially devastating nature of the penalties encourages “health care 
fraud” defendants to cooperate with the government to avoid them.89  The FCA has 
two specific penalties.90  First, treble damages are available for all false claims 
submitted.91  Second, a penalty of $5000 to $10,000 per false claim can be levied 
against the defendant.92  Congress intended that the assessment of damages under the 
FCA be “liberally measured to effectuate the remedial purposes of the Act.”93  While 
the government bears the burden of proving damages, the method of proof does not 
have to be scientifically exact.94  In addition to these specific penalties, a defendant 
found liable under FCA may face exclusion from the Medicare program; generally, 
exclusion from Medicare is a discretionary matter in a civil proceeding whereas in a 
criminal proceeding exclusion is mandatory.95  However, where exclusion may be 
for a period of years in a criminal matter, the government in the civil matter has the 
discretion to impose permanent exclusion from Medicare and other government 
funded health care programs.96 
Fearing the government’s power to exclude, most providers will begin settlement 
discussions early in the process to avoid heavier fines or criminal prosecution for 
their lack of “cooperation” with the government.97  Although the government may 
regain a portion of its loss, the harm sustained by the corporation as a result of the 
severe penalties and high legal fees will usually inflict a fatal wound to the 
corporation.98  
                                                          
type of case theory since the incentive to commit fraud will hinge more on the provision of 
low-cost, poor quality services rather than billing for unnecessary services or services not 
performed.  See Aussprung, supra note 28, at 30. 
89See Aussprung, supra note 28, at 9; Hilley, supra note 29. 
90See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(2) (1994). 
91See id. 
92See id. 
93See S. REP. 615 at 4.  
94See United States v. Killough, 848 F.2d 1523, 1531 (11th Cir. 1988). 
95See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(a) (1999). 
96See § 1320a–7(b)(1). 
97See Aussprung, supra note 28, at 20-21 (stating that in Metzinger defendants that did not 
cooperate ended up with settlement agreements less favorable than defendants that did.)   
98See Hilley, supra note 29. 
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C.  The Criminal Proceeding99 
When “health care fraud” is found to have been committed “willfully” with 
knowledge and intent to defraud, it is considered a crime under a number of federal 
statutes.  Although the federal criminal code includes statutes that address criminal 
“health care fraud,”100 federal prosecutors mostly utilize traditional generic fraud 
statutes to prosecute “health care fraud” because many of the situations currently 
subject to an indictment occurred before the enactment of these statutes.101  The most 
widely utilized criminal statute is mail fraud,102 followed by submission of false 
statements,103 and criminal false claims act.104  A person commits mail fraud when 
she schemes to defraud a victim, or obtain money or property by false or fraudulent 
pretenses and uses the postal service, or any private or commercial interstate carrier 
to accomplish this goal.105  
Federal officials have increasingly turned to criminal prosecutorial methods 
traditionally used to combat organized crime in their campaign to investigate and 
prosecute health care fraud.106  Federal investigators of health fraud have increased 
the number of seizures and “freezing” of assets of those suspected of defrauding the 
government.107  They increasingly indict health care fraud defendants for offenses 
such as money laundering,108 crimes under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizations Act [hereinafter “RICO”]109 and conspiracy.110  “Health care fraud” 
was added as an underlying offense to money laundering with the enactment of 
                                                                
99See Interview with Assistant United States Attorney Bud Paulissen, Criminal Division, 
Western District of Texas, in San Antonio, Texas (Mar. 12, 1999) (discussing general issues 
regarding prosecution of “health care fraud” from time of indictment through sentencing). 
100See 18 U.S.C. § 1347 (1998). 
101See Bucy, supra note 60. 
102See 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1999). 
103See § 1001. 
104See Bataglia, supra note 9, at 4. 
105See 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1999). 
106See Michael E. Runyan & David Reese Jennings, Practicing in the Field of Injunctions, 
U.S. ATT’YS BULL., Apr. 1997, at 23. 
107See 18 U.S.C. § 1345 (1999). This is the Health Care/Bank Fraud/Wire and Mail Fraud 
injunction statute recently amended.  Id.  Basically, this statute provides a civil remedy for 
criminal conduct.  See id.  It is utilized when an AUSA asks for an injunction to “freeze” the 
bank accounts of those in violation of health care provisions added to § 1345.  See Runyan, 
supra note 106, at 23; Thomas Wilder, Unconventional Laws Used In Fight Against Fraud By 
Federal Officials, NAAG HEALTH CARE FRAUD REPORT, July/Aug. 1996. 
108See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7)(F) (1999).  This statute was recently amended by HIPAA 
adding health care fraud as an underlying act for the purpose of establishing a crime under the 
money laundering statute.  See id. 
109See Daniel N. Burton & Michael S Popok, Managed Care, 75 FLA. B.J., 32 (1998) 
(describing how federal RICO and other forfeiture statutes have been expanded to include 
health care fraud as a predicate offense). 
110See 18 U.S.C. §§ 286, 371 (1999). 
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HIPAA.111  As a result, health care providers that commit “health care fraud” and 
then conduct financial transactions with the money obtained through the fraud may 
be laundering money.112 RICO has been utilized to prosecute physicians who 
conspire with attorneys and patients to submit false claims to insurers and physicians 
who make false claims for services not rendered.113  
In the criminal context, the government must prove each element of the offenses 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  The central issue is whether or not the conduct was 
criminal.114  Here, the struggle between the defense and the prosecution is whether or 
not the health care provider intended to defraud or only committed an inadvertent 
error, due to the complexity of the Medicare billing system.115  Determining intent is 
difficult due to the extremely complicated billing process required by the 
government.116  One reason the billing process is considered problematic is because 
federal officials and providers disagree on the meaning of the language utilized in 
billing forms; this difference in interpretation has been enough to convict providers 
for committing fraud.117 
Hiding behind the mire of regulations, health care providers complain that the 
government is unfairly prosecuting them for mistakes; however, it is important to 
note that the government must meet a very high burden of proof to charge a health 
care provider with a crime.  It is highly unlikely that a federal prosecutor would 
indict a defendant for “health care fraud” without being able to prove her case in 
light of the high esteem that most health care providers are held within the 
community, and the political and professional consequences of losing such a case.  
But equally disturbing is the fact that the DOJ in many cases charges under the FCA 
to take advantage of the doctrines of estoppel by judgment and res judicata.118  As a 
result, if the federal prosecutor declines to proceed with criminal prosecution under 
FCA,119 health care providers can still be found liable for fraudulent schemes where 
the government cannot prove a criminal wrongdoing.120  When the government’s 
prosecutor cannot prove her case beyond a reasonable doubt, the government’s 
interest of retribution for alleged wrongdoing will be vindicated through a civil 
action under the FCA.  Unfortunately, this prosecutorial “safety-net” allows innocent 
health care providers to be harmed. 
                                                                
111See § 1956(a)(1). 
112See Bucy, supra note 60, at 611. 
113See id. 
114See Thomas A. Withers et al., The Tao of the Health Care Fraud Trial, U.S. ATT’YS 
BULL., Apr. 1997, at 19. 
115See Dickey, supra note 23; Hilley, supra note 29. 
116See Dickey, supra note 23; Hilley, supra note 29. 
117See Hilley, supra note 29. 
118See Kristine DeBry et al., Health Care Fraud, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 815, 838 (1995). 
119See 18 U.S.C. § 287 (1994). 
120See DeBry, supra note 118, at 838. 
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1.  Criminal Penalties 
The punishment of individuals convicted of crimes related to “health care fraud” 
has been accomplished by a system of determinate sentencing since the enactment of 
the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 [hereinafter “ACT”].121  The ACT created the 
United States Sentencing Commission (within the judicial branch of the federal 
government), which was entrusted with developing determinate sentencing 
guidelines.122  These guidelines were created to provide uniformity in sentencing 
practices amongst the federal judiciary.123  Congress envisioned that the guidelines 
remove or at least lessen sentencing disparities among defendants found guilty of 
similar offenses with similar criminal histories.124  After a health care provider has 
been found guilty of “health care fraud,” the sentencing court determines what 
punishment the individual will receive within the statutory limitations.125  In addition 
to being incarcerated for a period of time, the “health care fraud” defendant may also 
be required to pay fines and restitution and forfeit any assets acquired with the 
proceeds from the fraudulent conduct.126  The majority of the federal statutes that can 
be applied to “heath care fraud” call for terms of imprisonment not to exceed five 
years per violation,127 and fines not to exceed $250,000.128 
The trial court determines the specific punishment of each “health care fraud” 
offender through application of the federal sentencing guidelines.129  The court 
begins this process by determining the “offense level.”  To determine the offense 
level, the sentencing guidelines assign a sentencing range to the crime or crimes 
which the defendant was convicted (the base offense level), and then provide for a 
number of upward or downward adjustments depending on the specific 
characteristics of the offense.130  If the defendant has been convicted of more than 
one crime, crimes which involve similar harm are grouped together and a combined 
score is assigned reflecting the seriousness of the harm.  If the offenses are unrelated 
in nature, the resulting offense level will be keyed to the most serious offense.131  It is 
likely in a “health care fraud” situation that the prosecutor will seek to charge the 
                                                                
121See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3742 (1994); 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (1994). 
122See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3742; 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998. 
123See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3742; 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998. 
124See 28 U.S.C. § 991(b) (1994). 
125See 18 U.S.C. §§ 286, 287, 371, 1001, 1341, 1343; 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b (1994) 
(providing five or ten year maximum terms of imprisonment). 
126See 18 U.S.C. §§ 286, 287, 371, 1001, 1341, 1343 (1998); 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b 
(1994). 
127See 18 U.S.C. §§ 286, 287, 371, 1001, 1341, 1343; 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b (1994). 
128See 18 U.S.C. § 3571(c) (1994). 
129§§ 3551-3742; 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (1994). 
130See Bucy, supra note 60, at 634. 
131See generally, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3742 (1994); 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (1994). 
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most serious offenses possible.132  Federal prosecutors feel compelled to do this due 
to the insignificant punishment provided for crimes of fraud.133  
Fraud is assigned a base offense level of six.134  Numerous upward and 
downward adjustments reflecting the unique nature of the particular “health care 
fraud” offense are applied to the base offense level.135  In the sentencing phase, the 
court may consider all conduct discovered from the investigation that is proved by a 
preponderance of the evidence, including uncharged conduct.136  The uncharged 
conduct utilized to determine sentencing includes conduct gleaned from evidence 
that was obtained in violation of the defendant’s constitutional rights,137 and 
acquitted conduct.138  When the defendant has successfully negotiated with the DOJ 
to only be charged with one felony, and acquitted of other charges, the conduct 
reflecting the acquitted conduct will still be utilized to determine the offense level.139 
The first adjustment applied to the base offense level is an adjustment for the 
amount of the “loss” caused by the crime, when drafting the guidelines for economic 
crimes, the original Sentencing Commission made “loss” the lynchpin of the 
sentencing process for crimes of fraud.140  Therefore, a certain number of points for 
any pecuniary loss over $2000 will be added to the base offense level of six.141  
“Loss” is determined by identifying two factors: 1) the total economic harm that 
resulted due to the defendant’s conduct, and 2) and the relevant harm - the portion of 
the total harm experienced by the victims.142  Regardless of the nature of the actual 
                                                                
132See Cedric L. Joubert, Determining “Loss” in Medicare Fraud Prosecutions, U.S. 
ATT’YS BULL., Apr. 1997, at 40. 
133See id.  Crimes of fraud alone only call for an unadjusted sentencing range of zero to six 
months while the unadjusted sentencing range for a crime such as money-laundering, a crime 
often charged in conjunction with crimes of health care fraud, is forty-six to fifty-seven 
months.  See generally U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL. 
134See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2F1.1 (a) (1998). 
135In determining the relevant conduct to be considered, the court will rely upon and adopt 
the Pre-sentence Report prepared by the U.S. Probation Department.  See United States v. 
Sidhu, 130 F.3d 644, 654 (5th Cir. 1997).  The defendant has the burden of producing any 
specific rebuttal evidence.  See id.  Without rebuttal evidence, it is proper for the court to 
adopt the report.  See id. 
136See United States v. Galloway, 976 F.2d 414, 419 (8th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 
U.S. 974 (1993) (upholding a sentence that relied upon uncharged conduct). 
137See United States v. McCroy, 930 F.2d 63, 68 (D.C. Cir. 1991) cert. denied, 502 U.S. 
1032 (1992). 
138See United States v. Concepcion, 983 F.2d 369, 387 (2d Cir. 1992). 
139See Sidhu, 130 F.3d at 654. 
140See Frank O. Bowman, Guest Editor’s Observations, 10 FED. SENT. R. 3 (Nov./Dec. 
1997). 
141The amount of the loss determines the number of points that will be added to the base 
offense level. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2F1.1 (b) (1998). 
142See Bowman, supra note 140. 
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loss, numerous circuits have determined that if the actual loss is less than the 
intended loss, the intended loss may be considered for purposes of sentencing.143  
However, certain limitations have been instituted in determining “loss.”  For 
example, the loss used to calculate the sentence must stem from the defendant’s 
criminal activity as opposed to civil violations.144  Maintaining this distinction where 
parallel “health care fraud” proceedings are involved is critical in the sentencing 
phase of the “health care fraud” defendant.  It is essential to insure that the “loss” 
utilized in determining the punishment of “heath care fraud” defendants arises from 
the charged conduct.  Additionally, a “loss” figure may be utilized for sentencing 
purposes only if the record supports by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
defendant intended a particular amount of loss or that a loss in that amount was 
probable.145  A factor of specific concern in determining loss in “health care fraud” is 
whether or not the provision of legitimate services to a beneficiary will be considered 
a mitigating factor in measuring loss.146  In “health care fraud” situations, several 
circuits have ordered the government to determine the value of the necessary 
services that were provided and reduce the proposed loss by this amount.147  This 
approach to calculating loss has been sharply criticized because it tends to view the 
loss from the perspective of the defendant rather than the victim.148  Federal 
prosecutors believe that this approach to determining loss does not adequately 
represent the risk to the victim and that it would be more equitable to give health 
care fraud defendants credit where benefits were received and the billing to the 
insurer was appropriate.149  However, this strategy is not meaningful in determining 
punishment because the billing has already been deemed to be fraudulent by the fact-
finder. 
After the determination of loss has been made, the sentencing court will next 
consider all relevant actions committed by the defendant in furtherance of the 
criminal conduct.150  In “health care fraud” crimes, there are certain adjustments that 
                                                                
143See United States v. Abud-Sanchez, 973 F.2d 835, 838 (10th Cir. 1992); United States 
v. Calhoun, 97 F.3d 518, 523 (11th Cir. 1996). 
144See Abud-Sanchez, 973 F.2d at 839, 843. 
145See id. at 838.  Statistical models that determine loss must have a sufficient factual 
basis.  See United States v. Galuzzo, 53 F.3d 334, 336 (7th Cir. 1995). 
146See Sidhu, 130 F.3d at 654; Carol C. Lam, Assessing Loss in Health Care Fraud Cases, 
10 FED. SENT. R. 146 (Nov./Dec. 1997). 
147See United States v. Rutgard, 116 F.3d 1270, 1271 (9th Cir. 1997); United States v. 
Jackson, 95 F.3d 500, 508 (7th Cir. 1996); United States v. Licciardi, 30 F.3d 1127, 1134 (9th 
Cir. 1996).  Similarly, several circuits have found that where a defendant has obtained a 
fraudulent bank loan, only the amount of the loan that the defendant intends not to repay may 
be considered the “intended loss.”  See e.g., United States v. Johnson, 16 F.3d 166 (7th Cir. 
1994); United States v. Shaw, 3 F.3d 311 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Menichino, 989 
F.2d 438 (11th Cir. 1992); United States v. Kopp, 951 F.2d 521, 523 (3d Cir. 1991); United 
States v. Smith, 951 F.2d 1164 (10th Cir. 1991).  For the value of services to be considered in 
determining loss, the defendant must provide rebuttal evidence.  See Sidhu, 130 F.3d at 654. 
148See Lam, supra note 146. 
149See id. 
150See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.3 (1998). 
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are usually considered. First, a determination is made as to whether or not the 
fraudulent scheme involved more than minimal planning.151  Minimal planning is 
present in any case where acts are repeated over a period of time or more complex 
planning than would normally be done before the commission of the offence.152  
Other upward adjustments to the base offense level include factors such as whether 
the defendant abused a position of public trust or special skill,153 whether or not the 
defendant was “an organizer or leader of a criminal activity that involved five or 
more participant or was otherwise extensive,”154 whether or not the offences 
impacted vulnerable victims,155 and whether or not the provider obstructed justice.156  
One adjustment that may be applied to the offense level is a downward adjustment 
for acceptance of responsibility.157  The earlier in the investigation that the “health 
care fraud” defendant decides to cooperate and enter a plea with the government the 
more likely the defendant will receive a two or three point reduction for his 
cooperation.158  Although the sentencing guidelines state that going to trial will not 
effect the offender’s ability to receive this adjustment, in practice, defendants that go 
to trial don’t receive this adjustment to their offense level. 
Once the trial court has determined the offense level as proscribed by the U.S. 
Sentencing Guidelines Manual it will next consider within which criminal history 
category the defendant falls; a separate score is calculated based on the defendant’s 
criminal history to determine the criminal history category.159  Most “health care 
fraud” defendants will be first-time offenders; therefore their assigned criminal 
history category will be category one.  The scores for the offense level and the 
criminal history category are then applied to a sentencing table containing a grid on 
which both scores appear at various levels.160  The point where these two scores 
intersect indicates the defendant’s guideline range expressed in months of 
imprisonment.161 
The court may choose to depart upward or downward from the sentencing 
guideline range if the case demonstrates certain “unusual features.”162  Features that 
may be considered for downward departures include whether the defendant provided 
                                                                
151See § 2f1.1(b)(2). 
152See § 1B1.1, n.1 (f). 
153See § 3B1.3; United States v. Burgos, 137 F.3d 841, 844 (5th Cir. 1998). 
154See Sidhu, 130 F.3d at 654; U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.1 (1998). 
155See Sidhu, 130 F.3d at 654; U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.3 (1998). 
156See Sidhu, 130 F.3d at 651; U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3C1.1 (1998). 
157See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1 (1998). 
158See id. 
159See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 4A1.1 – 4B1.4. 
160See § 5 Pt. A. 
161See id. 
16218 U.S.C. § 3553(c) (1996); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1. – 5K2 
(1998). 
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“substantial assistance to authorities,”163 whether the defendant was coerced,164 and 
whether the mental capacity of the defendant was diminished.165  The sentencing 
court would consider upward departures in situations where the defendant’s conduct 
resulted in harm to his victim, including extreme psychological injury, physical 
injury or death.166  It is important to note that if the “health care fraud” defendant 
loses her license to practice in her specific field as part of the plea agreement, this 
will most likely not be a basis for a downward departure.167 
Despite the apparent complexity of utilizing the sentencing guidelines to 
determine the appropriate sentence for intentional defrauders, these defendants face 
insignificant amounts of prison time.  For example, a first time defrauder has to 
defraud more than $40,000 before any sentence of imprisonment is mandated.168  A 
defendant whose actions caused a substantial loss of money also receives a strikingly 
insignificant sentence.  For example, if a defrauder pleads guilty to defrauding the 
government of twenty to forty million dollars he would only be sentenced to a term 
of imprisonment between thirty-seven and forty-six months in duration.169 
The adoption of Organizational Sentencing Guidelines170 by the United States 
Sentencing Commission may play a significant role in ensuring corporate 
compliance;171 however, in the health care context, their significance has yet to be 
realized.  Under these sentencing guidelines, institutional defendants cannot be 
imprisoned, only fined.172  A substantial number of institutional health care providers 
are depleted of their assets in the civil prosecution.173  Therefore, the possible 
                                                                
163See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1 (1998). 
164See § 5K2.12. 
165See § 5K2.13. 
166See §§ 5K2.1-.3. 
167See United States v. Hoffer, 129 F.3d 1196, 1202 (11th Cir. 1997). 
168The $40,000 figure assumes a “more than minimal planning” adjustment under U.S. 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2F1.1(b)(2)(a) and a defendant who pleads guilty early 
enough in the process to receive the two level downward adjustment for acceptance of 
responsibility under U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1(a) & (b).  Additionally, a 
first time offender must be responsible for a loss of more than $20,000 before a judge is 
required to impose even intermediate conditions of confinement such as home detention or 
community confinement.  See §§ 5F1.1-2. 
169This assumes that a first time offender is given a two-level enhancement for more than 
minimal planning under U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2F1.1(b)(2)(a), and a three-
level acceptance of responsibility downward adjustment pursuant to § 3E1.1(a)(b). 
170See §§ 8A1.1-8E1.2. 
171See In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 969 (Del. Ch. 1996) 
(stating that the United States Sentencing Commission adopted Organizational Sentencing 
Guidelines which will play a significant role in assessing criminal sanctions on corporations, 
and that the guidelines provide powerful incentives for corporations to have in place 
compliance programs to detect violation of law, to immediately report these violations to 
officials when discovered and to take prompt, voluntary remedial measures). 
172See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8A1.1 (1998). 
173See Hilley, supra note 29. 
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sanctions under the civil FCA alone have provided powerful incentives for 
corporations to have in place compliance programs to detect violation of law, to 
promptly report these violations to officials when discovered and to take prompt, 
voluntary remedial measures.174 
D.  Administrative Proceedings & Penalties 
Compliance with governmental regulations and involvement with the 
administrative agencies that enforce these regulations is an inherent component of 
almost all aspects of the health care delivery system.175  The health care provider and 
the administrative agencies are involved in a continuous relationship where the 
agency promulgates regulations that the health care provider strives to meet in order 
to assure reimbursement from the government.176  When an accusation of fraud is 
made, an additional administrative process is activated.177  
Along with being exposed to criminal and civil sanctions, the “health care fraud” 
defendant faces numerous administrative sanctions.  One of the most feared 
sanctions is exclusion as a provider from the federal health care program.178  A 
decision to exclude is discretionary in a civil proceeding but in a criminal proceeding 
a finding of fraud results in automatic exclusion.179  
In addition to exclusion from Medicare, the provider faces the possible loss of 
her professional license.180  Although loss of licensure is not automatic, the DOJ is 
vigilant in informing governing boards of professionals of the fraudulent conduct 
committed by its members.181  In particularly egregious situations, the DOJ will 
require that the individual health care provider voluntarily surrender his license to 
practice as part of the negotiated plea agreement to avoid more severe 
consequences.182  The imposition of either of these two sanctions will mean 
economic and professional ruin for the provider. 
                                                                
174But see Geri Aston, Fed Unveil New Fraud Disclosure Policy, AM. MED. NEWS, Nov. 9, 
1998 (pagination unavailable) (reporting that the new voluntary compliance program although 
less burdensome could possible be tougher treatment for providers because of its heavy-
handed language).  The protocols do not state what the mitigation is if a provider self-
discloses.  See id.  However, the guidelines for the new voluntary compliance program do 
affirmatively state that self-disclosure does not obligate the OIG “to resolve the matter in any 
particular way.”  See id. 
175See Website of Health Care Financing Administration, at 
<http://www.hcfa.gov/medicare/medicare.htm> (the Health Care Financing Administration 
[hereinafter “HCFA”] is responsible for the administration of the Medicare program).  
176See id. (indicating that billing is submitted to HCFA for payment). 
177See 1997 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 10. 
178See Goodman, supra note 46, at 10 (reporting that in this case the defendant argued that 
exclusion from Medicare was the death penalty for the institutional defendant). 
179See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a (1999) 
180See id. 
181See id. 
182See Hoffer, 129 F.3d at 1201. 
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V.  PROPOSAL 
Fraud is defined as the “intentional perversion of truth for the purpose of 
inducing another in reliance upon it to part with some valuable thing belonging to 
him. . . .”183  
In the legal realm only the criminally convicted can be punished.184  
Nevertheless, this is not the case in the prosecution of “heath care fraud.”  Health 
care providers are either being punished too severely (in civil proceedings) or not 
severely enough (in criminal proceedings).  In part, this inequity results because 
“health care fraud” is broadly defined to include a variety of acts that have nothing to 
do with the “intentional perversion of the truth.”  The words “health care fraud” have 
come to include a range of conduct, which includes mistakes, malpractice, and the 
provision of inadequate care and acts of intentional fraud. 
This definition of “health care fraud” results in the inequitable prosecution and 
disproportionate punishment of health care providers.  Health care providers that 
have made a mistake or have not made mistakes185 are being accused and punished 
of committing fraud just like those that have intentionally committed fraud.  
Congress, the DOJ, and health care providers recognize the need to limit the 
scope of what activity is identified as “health care fraud.”  In response to the 
devastating financial effects of the FCA, and concerns of the overzealous application 
of the statute, health care providers joined forces lobbying Congress to pass the 
Health Care Claims Guidance Act [hereinafter “HCCGA”].186  HCCGA provided 
several safe harbors with retroactive effectiveness.187 However, the HCCGA was 
allowed to die in committee.188  Instead, the Deputy Attorney General [hereinafter 
“DAG”] issued a memorandum to give guidance on the use of the FCA in the civil 
context to reduce the growing fear of health care providers that through the 
“unbridled prosecution” of “health care fraud” their livelihoods would be 
destroyed.189  The DAG further noted that the purpose of his memorandum was “to 
                                                                
183BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 660 (6th ed. 1990). 
184See Carol S. Steiker, Punishment and Procedure: Punishment Theory and The 
Criminal-Civil Procedural Divide, 85 GEO. L. J. 775, 803 (1997). 
185See Dickey, supra note 23. 
186See Rep. McCollum/AHA Health Care Fraud Bill Opposed By Justice, HHS, THE GRAY 
SHEET, May 11, 1998, at 1998 WL 9545914; Sean Martin, Bill to Soften False Claims Act 
Gaining Steam, AM. MED. NEWS, May, 18, 1998, at 9. 
187Martin, supra note 186, at 9 (discussing safe harbor provisions of proposed legislation).  
Critics of the bill stated that the real purpose of the bill was to rescue hospitals that were 
targets of federal investigations.  See Naftali Bendavid, Hospitals Lobby to Soften Blow of 
Anti-Fraud Law, CHI. TRIB., June 24, 1998, at 1.  In response, Janet Reno stated that she 
would encourage President Clinton to veto the bill because it would “gut our civil health care 
fraud program.”  See id. 
188See Ederer, supra note 40. 
189See MEMORANDUM, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATT’Y GENERAL, 
GUIDANCE ON THE USE OF THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT IN CIVIL HEALTH CARE MATTERS (June 
1998). 
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emphasize the importance of pursuing civil False Claims Act cases against health 
care providers in a fair and even-handed manner. . . .”190  
The intent of the “health care fraud” defendant should be the lynchpin in 
determining how the government resolves the case.  Prosecution of the health care 
fraud defendant should be limited by his intent to commit intentional fraud willfully 
and with knowledge.  If the health care fraud was committed intentionally then both 
the individual and institutional defendants should be criminally prosecuted.  Only 
acts of intentional fraud that can be proven beyond a reasonable doubt should be 
referred to as “health care fraud.”  Actual fraud should be the standard for labeling 
an action fraudulent rather than the almost strict liability standard currently being 
used regardless of intent in civil proceedings.  Under this model of defining health 
care fraud, the words “health care fraud” would only be utilized in the context of the 
criminal proceeding.  Thus, narrowing the scope of what is labeled “health care 
fraud” would allow the punishment of health care providers to correctly indicate the 
providers’ culpability, communicating a more accurate message to the community 
regarding the providers’ behavior in relation to billing practices and other areas of 
concern such as the provision of inadequate care or negligence.  Utilizing this 
framework, conduct that is less than intentional would be prosecuted within the civil 
context and referred to as “health care abuse.”  “Health care abuse” is defined as 
provider practices that fall short and are inconsistent with sound practices and result 
in unnecessary costs or remuneration for services that do not meet professionally 
recognized standards for health care.191  Health care providers that commit “health 
care abuse” could be held strictly liable as most are under the FCA. 
This model of reform would allow the government to fully realize its goals.  The 
government can recover its losses and reduce fraud without disrupting the delivery of 
health care services.  At the same time, it can send a strong message to health care 
fraud providers that fraudulent and reckless billing practices and other acts of fraud 
will not be tolerated.  Although, the health care fraud defendant found guilty within 
the criminal context would not be sued in the civil context for the same behavior, the 
government could recover its losses through restitution.  The sentencing court can 
order the individual and the corporate defendant to pay restitution.192  Restitution is 
not considered a part of the punishment but rather a remedial action to extinguish 
any harm suffered by the victim as a result of the offense.193  States with limited 
resources have already chosen to ask for restitution in the criminal proceeding rather 
than instituting a separate civil case.194  This paradigm allows the federal government 
to meet its goals while protecting health care providers. 
                                                                
190Id. 
191See 42 C.F.R. § 455.2 (1998). 
192See Bucy, supra note 60, at 638. 
193See id. 
194See Richard Blumenthal, Claims For Restitution: A Viable Remedy, NAAG HEALTH 
CARE FRAUD REPORT, Sept./Oct. 1997 (explaining that the Attorney General of Connecticut 
chose to file a claim for restitution in a pending federal criminal proceeding rather than file a 
separate civil claim). 
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
By combating “health care fraud,” the government hopes to recover the proceeds 
of fraud, punish true defrauders and deter continued fraudulent behavior while 
strengthening the health care delivery system.  Defining “health care fraud” narrowly 
would subject defendants to sanctions that are just, fair, and proportional to the 
committed conduct.  As a result, the government’s goals will be more fully realized 
when health care providers, no longer fearful of the consequences of being accused 
of fraud, can work closer and communicate more openly with government officials 
to clear up administrative difficulties without being disproportionately sanctioned for 
mistakes.  Simultaneously, the government can continue to send a message that 
intentional fraud within the health care system will not be tolerated. 
